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Optimal Tax Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities 
in a Dynamic Optimizing Macro Model 
 
 
Abstract  This paper develops a dynamic optimizing macro model with pollution externalities (on 
welfare and production) and market imperfections, and uses it to determine the first-best 
(socially-optimal) tax policy, including labor income, capital income and emission taxes.  We show 
that the first-best labor income and capital income taxes will specialize in removing production 
inefficiency caused by market imperfections.  However, in seeking to fully internalize the 
environmental externality and production inefficiency, the socially-optimal pollution tax will 
increase as the pollution externality in relation to the households’ welfare and firms’ 
productionincrease, and will decrease as the monopoly increases.  Furthermore, in investigating the 
impact of an anticipated shock in the emission tax policy on macroeconomic performance, it is 
found that the key factor determining the steady state effect of an announced increase in the emission 
tax rate on consumption and the capital stock is the relative magnitude of the production elasticity of 
the emission input and the environmental externality on production.  With regard to the transitional 
effect, we find that, during the period between the policy’s announcement and its implementation, 
the capital stock may “mis-jump” or “mis-adjust” from its long-term steady state.  
 
Keywords: Socially-optimal tax policy; Imperfect competition; Pigouvian tax; Anticipated emission 
tax; Environmental Kuznets curve.   
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Optimal Tax Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities 
in a Dynamic Optimizing Macro Model 
1. Introduction 
Many developing countries struggle with poverty and environmental degradation.  The 
authorities in these countries often encounter an apparent conflict when attempting to tackle these 
two problems, and therefore face the dilemma of high output at the cost of low environmental quality.  
A common reason given for such an outcome as this is that an improved environmental policy may 
restrict economic activities or crowd out the resources in the private sector, in which case the 
production activities of firms will deteriorate.  In reality, many OECD countries also encounter 
such problems and have thus introduced, or are considering implementing, different “ecological 
taxes” for environmental management (see Barde, 1997).1   
In this paper we attempt to analyze the contentious and important issues more closely and 
completely.  To explore these related issues, the analytical model we set up contains some novel 
characteristics.  First, our study is a general equilibrium analysis and the framework we adopt is a 
dynamic optimizing macro model with market imperfections and environmental externalities.  The 
characteristics of our model are helpful in terms of providing a more complete picture of the impact 
of environmental policy on consumption, capital accumulation and social welfare, and in terms of 
understanding the interactions between the final goods market, the intermediate goods market, and 
the factors market (including labor, capital, and pollution emissions).  Essentially, this analysis will 
investigate not only the steady state effect, but also the transitional effect of an anticipated emission 
tax.  Investigating the transitional effect is particularly important, since the evidence appears to 
have revealed that environmental authorities usually implement their policies with a 
pre-announcement.2  However, with very few exceptions, most of the literature is only concerned 
                                                 
1 A vast literature deals with the relationship between economic growth and pollution embodied in an intertemporal 
optimization model since the early 1970s when an energy crisis caused a worldwide recession.  The earlier studies, 
such as Arrow and Kurz (1970), Keeler, et al. (1971), and Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991), concluded that there is a 
trade-off between economic growth and environmental preservation.  More recently, Gradus and Smulders (1993), 
Bovenberg and Smulders (1995), Byrne (1997), Mohtadi (1996), and Smulders and Gradus (1996) have proposed that 
an ambitious environmental policy may stimulate the economic growth rate and, as a result, the trade-off is invalid.    
2 There is a typical example: On July 13, 2000, the U.K.’s Treasury announced that the government budget for the 
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with the steady state effects of the environmental policy and ignores the possible announcement 
effects which may be more novel and interesting.3  This study will fill this gap in the existing 
literature and uncover new findings that have long been ignored in the relevant literature.  For 
instance, in this study we find that, following an announced increase in the emission tax, during the 
period between the policy’s announcement and its implementation the private capital stock may 
“mis-jump” or “mis-adjust” from its long-term steady state.  This will provide an implication to 
those environmental policy-makers.  As stated by Aoki (1985, p. 415), “[b]ecause misadjusting 
variables give wrong signals to economies, it is important to know when economic variables can 
misadjust as well as to know whether misadjusting behavior can be eliminated or mitigated by 
appropriate policy actions.”   
With regard to the steady state effects of environmental taxation, in the presence of market 
imperfections and environmental externalities, we ask under what conditions it is possible to 
simultaneously realize a high output (or a high level of employment) and environmental preservation.  
Under what conditions is increasing emission taxes socially welfare improving?  What is the role 
played by the market power of firms in terms of the effectiveness of the environmental tax policy?  
Generally speaking, the results yielded by our model potentially point out that the output 
(employment) double dividend in terms of high output (a high level of employment) and 
environmental preservation can be achieved by an ambitious environmental policy even if the 
revenue from the environmental tax is recycled in a non-distortionary lump-sum transfer, rather than 
being used to cut pre-existing distortionary taxes.  This concept is very different from the 
traditional double-dividend hypothesis, which argues that when the additional tax revenue from the 
emission tax is used to cut other distortionary taxes, the governments will reap a double-dividend by 
mitigating the distortion effect caused by taxation.   
Moreover, in response to an increase in the emission tax, for consumption and capital accumulation to either increase or decrease crucially 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Environmental Protection Agency would increase 15% every year over the next three years.  A similar situation also 
occurred in France, where in 2000 the government also claimed that the Environmental Protection Agency would be 
increased by about 9.2% in 2001. 
3 Bovenberg and Smulders (1996) explore the dynamic effects of environmental policies, but the policies in their model 
are unanticipated.  Chen, et al. (2003) may be an exception.  They analyze the transitional impacts of anticipated 
shock in public abatement policies.   
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depends on the relative sizes of the productivity return from utilizing emissions and the negative production externality arising from that.  In 
addition, when the environmental externality is relatively large, the consumption and capital effects of environmental taxation will be reinforced 
by the degree of monopoly in the market.  
Second, in this study there are two kinds of distortions: (i) production inefficiency caused by 
imperfect competition in the intermediate goods market; and (ii) the negative externalities from the 
environment that affect both the households’ utility and the firms’ production.  These market 
distortions will give the government an incentive to set the first-best (socially-optimal) tax policy so 
as to remedy these production inefficiency and environmental externalities.  We especially 
emphasize that there is a considerable body of literature dealing with environmental tax policy under 
imperfect competition (e.g., Barnett, 1980, Conrad and Wang, 1993, Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994, 
and Ebert and van dem Hagen, 1998).  However, to the best of our knowledge, most existing 
studies, if not all, adopt a static and partial general model without capital accumulation.4  In our 
dynamic macro model three different taxes, including labor income, capital income, and emission 
taxes, are considered.  By giving these issues more detailed consideration, we will show that 
different taxes play a distinct role in terms of remedying the distortions in the markets.  Of interest, 
we find that a socially-optimal emission tax may be characterized by a Keynesian-like stabilizer that 
is designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations, e.g. stimulate the economy with a lower emission 
tax during recessions.  These results clearly contribute new insights and implications to the 
so-called Pigouvian tax.   
Finally, in this study we would like to answer the following question: can economic growth be a 
part of the solution to rather than the cause of environmental problems?  This claim has been firmly 
put forward in recent years by examining the existence of the relationship between levels of income 
and certain measures of environmental quality, i.e. the so-called environmental Kuznets curve 
(EKC).5  Specifically, the EKC describes the relationship between pollutants and income as an 
                                                 
4 Elbasha and Roe (1996) also set up a dynamic model with market imperfections and pollution externalities.  However, 
they assume that there exists a pollution externality only in relation to the households’ utility.  The main concern of 
the present paper lies with the firms’ production.  In addition, their analysis is restricted to the steady-state effect and 
ignores the transitional effect.    
5 See Grossman and Krueger (1995) and two special issues in Ecological Economics (1998) and Environment and 
Development Economics (1997) for details.   
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inverted-U, increasing levels of pollution for people living in lower income countries and decreasing 
levels of pollution for those with higher per capita income.  To respond to this important issue, we 
will investigate the relationship between output and pollution in both decentralized and centralized 
economies.  
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.  The analytical framework is outlined in Section 2.  
Section 3 discusses the dynamic properties of the macro system and examines the steady state effect 
and the transitional dynamics of an anticipated emission taxation policy.  Given the distortions in 
the market, Section 4 investigates the characteristics of the first-best taxation policy, particularly 
focusing on the socially-optimal environmental tax.  Section 5 investigates the relationship between 
output and pollution in a dynamic macro model.  Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model   
The model consists of three types of agents: households, firms, and the government.  The 
household derives utility from consumption, but incurs disutility from work and the external damage 
of aggregate pollution produced by firms.  The production side of the economy comprises two 
sectors: the intermediate good sector and the final good sector.  The intermediate good market is 
characterized by monopolistic competition, while the final good market is perfectly competitive.  
The intermediate good producers, who face a stochastic disturbance, operate with a Cobb-Douglas 
technology that uses capital, labor, and emissions as factors of production.  In the final good sector, 
goods are homogeneous and produced from the set of intermediate goods.  In addition, for 
simplicity, we assume that the final good firms do not generate pollution.  The government levies 
taxes, including a capital tax, a labor income tax and an emission tax, and balances its budget each 
period.  Since there exist two types of distortions in this economy – imperfect competition and 
environmental externalities, the government has an incentive to intervene in the markets by setting 
the first-best tax policy.  
  
2.1. Firms and symmetric equilibrium  
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The basic production environment we consider is akin to Guo and Lansing (1999).  To shed 
light on our point, we incorporate environmental externalities in production into our model.  
The final good market 
There is a single final good in the economy, which can be consumed, accumulated as capital, 
and paid for as taxes.  Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the final good, ty , is produced using a 
continuum of intermediate inputs ity , ]1,0[∈i .  Specifically, the final good production technology 
is given by:  
)1/(1
1
0
1 ][ ηη −−∫= diyy itt ; )1,0[∈η ,            (1) 
Accordingly, the profit maximization problem for the final good firm is expressed as: 
diypy itittyit ∫−
1
0
 max ,              (2) 
s.t.  )1/(1
1
0
1 ][ ηη −−∫= diyy itt .  
In (2) itp  is the relative price of the i-th intermediate good and the final good is viewed as the 
numeraire.   
The first-order condition for this optimization problem is given by:  
ηη −= ittit yyp .                (3) 
Equation (3) is the demand function for the i-th intermediate good.  It is easy to learn that the price 
elasticity of demand for ity  is η/1− .  When 0=η , intermediate goods are perfect substitutes in 
the production of the final good, implying that the intermediate good sector is perfectly competitive.  
If 0>η , intermediate good firms face a downward-sloping demand curve that can be exploited to 
manipulate prices; η  thus measures the degree of monopoly of the intermediate good firms. 
The intermediate good market 
Intermediate good producers operate in a monopolistic market.  Each intermediate producer 
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uses a symmetric technology as follows:  
 βθααθ −−−== titititttititittit ShekAShekfAy 1),,,( ,          (4) 
where tA  is an economic shock (a technology parameter), and itk , ith , and ite  are the capital, 
labor, and emission inputs employed by the i-th intermediate good producer, respectively.  The term 
tS  represents the negative externality stemming from aggregate pollution damage.  Since pollution 
is a by-product in the production of intermediate goods, total pollution is the sum of emissions 
produced by all intermediate good firms, i.e. dieS itt ∫= 10 .  Moreover, the parameters θ , α , 
θα −−1 , and )0(>β  measure the weights of the private capital, emissions, labor, and the 
pollution externality on production, respectively.  In order to ensure a positive but diminishing 
marginal productivity of capital, emissions, and labor, we assume that 1 ,0 << αθ , and that 
01 >−− θα .  
To produce output, an intermediate good firm will rent capital and labor from households and pay 
emission tax to the government for permission to emit pollution.  Thus, given the demand function 
for the final good firms (3) and the production function (4), the optimization problem of the 
intermediate good producer i is to choose itk , ith , and ite  so as to maximize profits, itπ , i.e.: 
iteittittititit ehwkryp τπ −−−=max ,           (5) 
s.t.   ηη −= ittit yyp  and βθααθ −−−= tititittit ShekAy 1 ,           
where tr  is the interest rate, tw  is the wage rate, and eτ  is the emission tax rate.  The first-order 
conditions for this optimization problem are: 
][)1( 11 βθααθηη θη −−−−−−= tititittittt ShekAyyr
it
itit
k
ypθη)1( −= ,       (6a) 
])1[()1( βθααθηη θαη −−−− −−−= tititittittt ShekAyyw
it
itit
h
yp)1)(1( θαη −−−= ,    (6b) 
][)1( 11 βθααθηη αητ −−−−−−= tititittitte ShekAyy
it
itit
e
ypαη)1( −= .       (6c)  
Symmetric equilibrium  
Our analysis is confined to a symmetric equilibrium under which tit pp = , tit kk = , tit hh = , 
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tit ee = , tit yy = , and tit ππ = , for all i.  Due to the continuum of intermediate good firms of unit 
mass, the symmetric equilibrium also implies that ttit See == .  As a result, under symmetric 
equilibrium the production function can be restated as: 
 βαθαθ −−−= ttttt ShkAy 1 .              (4a) 
Because the final good market is perfectly competitive, the free-entry equilibrium is pinned 
down by the zero-profit condition: 
0
1
0
=− ∫ diypy ititt ,               
implying 1== tit pp  in equilibrium.  Given the symmetric equilibrium and 1=tp , (6a)-(6c) is 
rewritten as:  
t
t
t k
yr θη)1( −= ,               (7a) 
t
t
t h
yw )1)(1( θαη −−−= ,             (7b) 
t
t
e e
yαητ )1( −= ,               (7c) 
and, consequently, the profit of intermediate producers is given by: 
ttetttttt yehwkry ητπ =−−−= .            (8) 
We can learn from (8) that η  not only measures the degree of monopoly, but also represents the 
equilibrium profit share of national income; if 0>η , intermediate firms earn an economic profit.   
 
2.2. Households  
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical and infinitely-lived households.  At 
each instant of time, the representative household is bound by a flow budget constraint linking 
capital accumulation to any difference between its after-tax income (including rental, wage, profit, 
and transfer income) and expenditure (consumption).  Thus, the household will choose 
consumption, tc , and hours worked, th , so as to maximize the discounted sum of future 
instantaneous utilities.   
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The household’s optimization problem can be expressed by: 
 dteShc tttt ρ
ψεσ
ψξεσ
−
++∞ −
+−+Λ−−∫ ]111[max
11
0
1
;  0>σ , 0>ε , 0>ψ , 0>Λ  and 0>ξ , (9) 
 s.t.   tttttkttwt cTRkrhwk −++−+−= ))(1()1( πττ& ,        (10) 
where an overdot denotes the rate of change with respect to time, )0(>ρ  is the subjective time 
preference rate, wτ  is the rate of labor income tax, kτ  is the rate of capital tax, and 0>tTR  ( 0< ) 
is a lump-sum transfer (lump-sum tax).  The constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution form 
of utility (9) yields the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ/1 .  Moreover, Λ  and ξ  
measure the impact of work and pollution on the households’ welfare, respectively. 
Following the common assumption in the relevant literature, e.g., Ligthart and van der Ploeg 
(1994), Michel and Rotillon (1995), Elbasha and Roe (1996), and Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997), 
when households make their choices, the damage caused by environmental pollution is taken as 
given since households feel that their activities are too insignificant to affect the aggregate pollution.  
With this understanding, the optimal conditions necessary for this optimization problem are as 
follows: 
 ttc λσ =− ,                 (11a) 
 twtt wh )1( τλε −=Λ ,              (11b) 
 )1( ktttt r τλρλλ −=+− & ,             (11c) 
together with (10) and the transversality condition 0lim =−∞→
t
ttt
ek ρλ .  In (11a)-(11c), tλ  is the 
co-state variable which can be interpreted as the shadow value of private capital stock, measured in 
utility terms.   
 
2.3. Government budget constraint 
The government collects taxes and redistributes these tax revenues to households as a transfer 
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payment in a lump-sum manner.  Accordingly, at any instant in time, the government budget 
constraint can be expressed as: 
tetttkttwt ekrhwTR τπττ +++= )( .           (12) 
We assume that the government balances its budget in any period by adjusting the lump-sum transfer 
tTR .   
 
3. The Effects of Tax Policies in the Market Equilibrium 
First of all, (11a) and (11b) can be consolidated to remove the co-state variable tλ , yielding 
tw
t
t w
c
h
)1( τσ
ε
−=Λ− .               (13) 
Moreover, by putting (11a) and (11c) together, we obtain the well-known Keynes-Ramsey rule: 
])1[(1 ρτσ −−= tkt
t r
c
c&
.              (14) 
In addition, by substituting the government’s budget constraint (12), the intermediate good 
producers’ profits (8), and the optimization condition for intermediate producers (7a)-(7c) into the 
household’s budget constraint (10), the aggregate resource constraint for the economy is given by:   
ttt cyk −=& .                (15) 
 Under symmetric equilibrium, the optimizing macro model can be summarized by the following 
equations: (13)-(15), (7a)-(7c), and (4a), which jointly determine tc , tk , th , ty , tr , tw , and tS .  
For ease of derivation, we first use (4a), (7a), (7b), (7c) and (13) to solve tr , tw , th , and tS  for 
the instantaneous relationships as follows:   
),,,,( ewtttt Akcrr ττ= ; βαττ ><<><><< ifrrrrr ewAkc ,0,0,0,0,0 ,   (16a) 
),,,,( ewtttt Akcww ττ= ; βαττ ><<>>>>> ifwwwww ewAkc ,0,0,0,0,0 ,  (16b) 
),,,,( ewtttt AkcSS ττ= ; ,0,0,0,0,0 <<>>< ew SSSSS Akc ττ     (16c) 
),,,,( ewtttt Akchh ττ= ; βαττ ><<><>>< ifhhhhh ewAkc ,0,0,0,0,0 .  (16d) 
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The exact expressions of the comparative statics in (16a)-(16d) are relegated to Appendix A.   
Substituting (4a), (16a), (16c), and (16d) into (14) and (15), we have:  
]),,,,()1[(1 ρτττσ −−= ewtttkt
t Akcr
c
c&
,           (17) 
tewtttewtttttt cAkchAkcSkAk −= −−− θαβαθ ττττ 1)],,,,([)],,,,([& .      (18) 
Equations (17) and (18) constitute the dynamic system of the macro model.   
By linearizing (17) and (18) around the steady-state consumption and physical capital, denoted 
by ∗tc  and 
∗
tk , we have: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
++++
+++++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
ρτττ
ρτττ
dadAadadada
dadAadadada
cc
kk
aa
aa
c
k
tkew
tkew
tt
tt
t
t
2726252423
1716151413
*
*
2221
1211
&
&
,   (19) 
The exact expressions of xza  for 1=x ,2 and 7,,1 L=z  are arranged in Appendix B.  By 
defining 1µ  and 2µ  as the two characteristic roots of the dynamic system, (19) allows us to 
establish the following lemma:  
 
Lemma 1.  The dynamic system is characterized by saddle-point stability and displays a unique 
perfect-foresight equilibrium.   
Proof:  See Appendix C.   
As shown in Appendix C, the two characteristic roots of the dynamic system are of opposite sign, 
implying that the system displays saddle-point stability.  Given this, since there exists one jump 
variable, tc , in our model, this dynamic system will display a unique perfect-foresight equilibrium.  
As addressed in the literature on dynamic rational expectations models, including Burmeister (1980), 
Buiter (1984) and Turnovsky (1995), the dynamic system will have a unique perfect-foresight 
equilibrium if the number of unstable roots equals the number of jump variables. 
 
3.1 Comparative statics  
At the steady state, the economy is characterized by 0== tt kc && , and hence tc  and tk  are at 
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their stationary levels, *tc  and 
*
tk .  Accordingly, from (19) with 0== tt kc && , we have: 
 
Proposition 1.  In the presence of an environmental externality on production, the effects of tax 
policy on steady-state consumption and capital accumulation are given by:  
0
*
<∂
∂
w
tc
τ , 0
*
<∂
∂
w
tk
τ ;               
0
*
<∂
∂
k
tc
τ , 0
*
<∂
∂
k
tk
τ ;               
0
*
<>∂
∂
e
tc
τ , 0
*
<>∂
∂
e
tk
τ , as βα >
< .              
Proof:  See Appendix D.   
Proposition 1 indicates that increasing taxes on labor and capital incomes will give rise to a negative 
effect on consumption and the capital stock.  This result is consistent with the common notion in 
the existing literature, for example Judd (1987).   
A more interesting result pointed out by Proposition 1 is that imposing a pollution tax on 
intermediate firms has an ambiguous effect on consumption and the capital stock, depending upon 
the relative magnitude of α  and β .  Intuitively, increasing the emission tax rate will discourage 
the intermediate firms from utilizing the emission input and will hence reduce the total pollution.  
Under symmetric equilibrium ( tt Se = ), if the return from utilizing the emission factor is greater than 
its negative externality on production (i.e. βα > ), the decrease in S will lower the marginal 
productivity of private capital βαθαθθ −−−−= ttttk ShkAMP t 11 .  From (6a) or (7a), this implies that the rental 
rate will fall and, as a consequence, households will tend to reduce their investment expenditure.  
As such, the aggregate output and consumption will decrease as well (inferred from resource 
constraint (15) with 0=tk& ), as we will see more clearly in Corollary 1.  However, when the 
negative externality of pollution on production is relatively large ( βα < ), a decrease in the 
pollution will give rise to a favorable effect for firms in terms of their production.  This will 
increase both the marginal productivity of private capital and the rental rate.  As a result, the steady 
state consumption and capital stock will increase in response.   
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 Following from Proposition 1, we immediately have two corollaries as follows: 
 
Corollary 1.  In the presence of an environmental externality on production:  
(i) An environmental tax is not only able to improve the quality of the environment 
0/ <∂∂ etS τ , but may also reap the output dividend 0/* >∂∂ ety τ  (if 0<− βα ) and the 
employment dividend 0/* >∂∂ eth τ  (if 0))(1( <−− βασ ), even though the revenues from 
the environmental tax are recycled in a non-distortionary lump-sum transfer tTR , rather 
than used to cut the pre-existing distortionary tax wτ  or kτ .  
(ii) Under conditions 0<− βα  and 01 <−σ , an increase in the emission tax will increase 
social welfare.  
Proof:  See Appendix E.     
Corollary 1(i) first indicates that a government imposing a pollution tax can reap a double-dividend 
in terms of a better environmental quality and a higher output, provided that βα < .  The 
reasoning is straightforward.  Since output must be equal to consumption in equilibrium (inferred 
from (15) with 0=k& ), Proposition 1 has implicitly pointed out that increasing taxes on pollution 
can also boost output.  However, to achieve the employment double dividend, a stricter condition 
0))(1( <−− βασ  should be satisfied.  If 0>− βα , an increase in the emission tax eτ , as 
indicated by Proposition 1, will discourage consumption.  At the same time, if the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution in consumption σ/1  is smaller, specifically, less than unity (or 1>σ ), 
such as in many developing countries, households will be less willing to sacrifice the present 
consumption in exchange for an increase in future consumption.  Under such a condition, given that 
households prefer more consumption in the present, they must increase their labor supply in order to 
support more consumption in the present.  Therefore, if 0))(1( <−− βασ , increasing eτ  will 
result in more employment dividend being reaped.   
One point should be emphasized.  The traditional double-dividend hypothesis argues that if the 
additional tax revenue from an emission tax can be used to cut other distortionary taxes, 
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governments may reap a “double-dividend” – not only a cleaner environment but also 
non-environmental benefits associated with lower distortionary effects (see, for example, Pearce, 
1991, Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994, and Bovenberg, 1997).  However, Corollary 1 shows that the 
employment (or output) double dividend can be realized by an ambitious environmental policy even 
if the revenues from the environmental tax are recycled through a non-distortionary lump-sum 
transfer, when the externality from the environment on production is taken into account.   
In addition, if the conditions 0<− βα  and 01 <−σ  are satisfied (hence 0))(1( <−− βασ  
automatically holds), an increase in the emission tax on firms will increase consumption and 
decrease both labor supply and pollution in the economy.  Accordingly, we can conclude that 
increasing the emission tax is socially improving.   
 
Corollary 2.  If βα < , the consumption and capital effects of environmental taxation will be 
reinforced by the degree of monopoly.   
Proof:  See Appendix F.   
Proposition 1 shows that increasing the emission tax rate will reduce total pollution and, given that 
βα < , this will give rise to a beneficial effect for firms in terms of their production.  Since the 
marginal productivity of private capital increases, consumption and private capital also increase.  
As the intermediate good market becomes less competitive, a higher degree of monopoly η  tends 
to generate more profits for firms and increases the disposable income of households (see (10)).  
This, as in the relevant literature, such as Dixon (1987) and Mankiw (1988), gives rise to an 
additionally positive feedback effect, which intensifies the impact of the emission tax.   
 
3.2 Transitional dynamics of a change in the emission tax with pre-announcement  
In this sub-section we will trace the possible adjustment patterns of consumption and capital 
accumulation in response to a change in the emission tax policy.  As mentioned in the Introduction, 
since the environmental authorities usually implement policies with a pre-announcement, our 
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analysis will deal with an anticipated change in the environmental tax policy.  This analytical 
framework is easily extended to investigate the effects of changing the labor and capital income 
taxes.  However, because this issue has been debated completely in the macroeconomics literature, 
we will abstract it from this sub-section.    
Figures 1-3 will be used to proceed to our graphical analysis.  It follows from (19) and 
Appendix B that the 0=tc&  locus is downward sloping while the 0=tk&  locus is upward sloping, 
i.e. 
0/)/( 12110 >−=∂∂ = aakc tktt &  and 0/)/( 22210 <−=∂∂ = aakc tctt & .   
Given that the dynamic system is characterized by saddle-point stability, we further define the SS  
curve and the UU  curve as representing the stable and unstable branches, respectively.  As shown 
in Figure 1, SS  is upward sloping and UU  is downward sloping.   
With the graphical apparatus provided by Figure 1, we suppose that at time 0=t  the authority 
announces that the emission tax rate will permanently rise from 0eτ  to 1eτ  at Tt =  in the future.  
From (19), we can obtain: 
0
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;   if βα >< .        
These two equations indicate that, in response to a rise in the emission tax rate, both 0=tc&  and 
0=tk&  may shift either upward or downward, depending on the relative strength of α  and β .  
Therefore, in what follows we will consider two possible cases: (i) αβ >  and (ii) αβ < . 
(i) The βα <  case 
In Figure 2, the initial equilibrium where )(0 0etc τ=&  intersects )(0 0etk τ=&  is established at 
0E  and the initial consumption and capital stock are 0c  and 0k , respectively.  Given that βα < , 
following an anticipated permanent rise in eτ , both )(0 0etc τ=&  and )(0 0etk τ=&  will shift upward 
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to )(0 1etc τ=&  and )(0 1etk τ=& , respectively.  Accordingly, the new steady-state equilibrium is at 
point *E , with tc  and tk  being 
∗c  and ∗k , respectively.  This result is consistent with that in 
Proposition 1 whereby an increase in the emission tax will stimulate consumption and the capital 
stock when the return from utilizing the emission factor is less than its negative externality on 
production (i.e. βα < ).   
Before proceeding to study the economy’s dynamic adjustment, three points should be noted.  
First, for expository convenience, in what follows we denote −0  and +0  as the instants before and 
after the policy announcement, respectively, while −T  and +T  are denoted as the instants before 
and after the policy’s implementation, respectively.  Second, during the dates between +0  and −T , 
the emission tax rate remains at its initial level 0eτ  and, therefore, point 0E  should be treated as 
the reference point that governs the dynamic adjustment of tc  and tk .  Third, since the public 
fully recognizes that the emission tax rate will increase from 0eτ  to 1eτ  at the instant +T , the 
transversality condition requires that the economy will move to a point on the convergent stable 
branch associated with 1eτ  (i.e. )( 1eSS τ ) at that instant in time.  
Based on the above information, Figure 2 indicates that, given βα < , there are two possible 
adjustment patterns for consumption and the capital stock that crucially depend on the slope of the 
)( 1eSS τ  curve.  For the purpose of illustration, we first draw a line connecting the initial 
equilibrium point 0E  with the new equilibrium point *E .  This line is named the LL  locus.  As 
is evident in Figure 2, the relative steepness between the LL  schedule and the convergent branch 
)( 1eSS τ  is ambiguous.  If )( 1eSS τ  is flatter than LL , say )( 11 eSS τ , following an increase in the 
emission tax the economy will instantaneously jump from point 0E  to a point +0E  on impact.  
That is, at the instant of the policy announcement, tc  will immediately rise from 0c  to +0c , while 
tk  is fixed at 0k  since it is predetermined.  From time 
+0  to −T , as indicated by the arrows in 
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Figure 2, consumption first decreases then increases and the stock of capital monotonically decreases.  
At time +T  when the policy is implemented, the economy reaches point TE , which is exactly on 
the convergent stable path )( 11 eSS τ .  Subsequently, from +T  onwards, both consumption and the 
capital stock increase as the economy moves along the )( 11 eSS τ  curve towards its stationary 
equilibrium *E .  
One point is worth noting here.  The jump magnitude of consumption is negatively related to 
the value of T at the instant +0 .  In the limiting case, if the shock of the environmental policy is 
unanticipated, i.e. 0=T , at the instant +0  the economy will instantaneously jump to point D  
that is exactly on the stable locus )( 11 eSS τ .  This implies that if the value of T  is small enough, 
consumption may exhibit an increasing tendency during +0  to −T .     
In the other case, if )( 1eSS τ  is steeper than LL , say )( 12 eSS τ , at the instant +0  when the 
policy is announced, the economy will immediately jump from point 0E  to point +′0E  on impact, 
meaning that consumption will discontinuously fall from 0c  to +′0c .  From +0  to −T , as 
indicated by the arrows in Figure 2, consumption will first rise and then fall, while the capital stock 
will start to accumulate.  At time +T  when the rate of the emission tax eτ  actually increases, the 
economy will reach the point TE ′  that is on the convergent stable path )( 12 eSS τ .  Thereafter, both 
tc  and tk  will keep on rising as the economy moves along the )(
1
2 eSS τ  curve towards its 
stationary equilibrium *E .  
(ii) The αβ <  case 
Given that αβ < , in response to an anticipated increase in the emission tax, )(0 0etc τ=&  and 
)(0 0etk τ=&  will shift downward to )(0 1etc τ=&  and )(0 1etk τ=& , respectively, as indicated in Figure 
3.  By comparing the original equilibrium point 0E  with the new equilibrium point *E , we learn 
that both consumption and the capital stock will fall, as predicted by Proposition 1.  
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In a way similar to Figure 2, two possible adjustment patterns of tc  and tk  may be presented.  
In Figure 3 if the )( 1eSS τ  locus is flatter (steeper) than the LL  line, say )( 11 eSS τ  ( )( 12 eSS τ ), then 
at the instant of the policy announcement, the economy will instantaneously jump from point 0E  to 
point +′0E  ( +0E ) on impact, meaning that consumption will immediately fall (rise) from 0c  to +′0c  
( +0c ), while tk  is fixed at 0k .  From time 
+0  to −T , as shown by the arrows in Figure 3, 
consumption will first rise (fall) then fall (rise) and the capital stock will increase (decrease).  At 
time +T , the economy will reach point TE ′  ( TE ) that is exactly on the convergent stable path 
)( 11 eSS τ  ( )( 12 eSS τ ).  After that, both tc  and tk  will decrease monotonically as the economy 
moves along the )( 11 eSS τ  ( )( 12 eSS τ ) curve towards its stationary equilibrium *E . 
We summarize the above results (including the two cases) as follows: 
 
Proposition 2.  In response to an anticipated permanent increase in the emission tax:  
(i) The capital stock may exhibit a mis-adjustment: e.g., in the αβ <  case it increases 
during the period between the policy’s announcement and its implementation (the 
0E - +′0E - TE ′  trajectory); once the policy is realized, however, it decreases (the TE ′ - *E  
trajectory) in the long run.   
(ii) Consumption may exhibit mis-jumping and mis-adjustment patterns: e.g., in the βα <  
case it follows the 0E - +′0E - TE ′  trajectory during the period between the policy’s 
announcement and its implementation, and follows the TE ′ - *E  trajectory when the policy 
is realized.  
 
4. First-Best Tax Policy  
Owing to the imperfectly competitive behavior of intermediate good firms and the presence of 
pollution externalities, the market equilibrium is inefficient.  In the Pareto optimum, the social 
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planner will internalize the pollution externalities and the market imperfections.  By comparing 
these two systems, we will find the first-best tax policy in this section.  
The social planner, subject to the aggregate resource constraint (15), maximizes the social 
welfare function reported in (9) by choosing , , , ttt khc and tS .  By letting tv  be the co-state 
variable associated with the aggregate resource constraint (15), the optimal conditions for the social 
planner’s optimization problem are given by: 
 tt vc =−σ ,                 (20a) 
 θαβαθε θα −−−−−=Λ tttttt hSkAvh )1( ,           (20b) 
 θαβαθθρ −−−−=+− 11 ttttttt hSkAvvv& ,            (20c) 
 θαβαθψ βαξ −−−−−= 11)( tttttt hSkAvS ,           (20d) 
In (20d) we should specify that βα >  in the centralized economy in order to ensure a positive level 
of aggregate pollution damage tS .   
Let superscript “o ” be the first-best tax rate associated with the relevant variables.  Thus, we 
can establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3.  In the presence of environmental externalities and market imperfections, the 
first-best tax policy is given by:  
0
1
<−
−== η
ηττ okow ,              (21) 
0
)(
)1(
)(
)1(
)(
)1( >⋅−
−=−⋅−
−=⋅−
−= − MRSMu
Mu
c
S
c
S
t
to
e βα
ηα
βα
ηαξ
βα
ηατ σ
ψ
.      (22) 
Proof:  See Appendix G.   
Proposition 3 provides interesting and novel results which contribute to important policy 
implications.  These findings are in turn summarized as follows: 
1. The result reported in (21) indicates that, similar to the findings of Guo and Lansing (1999), a 
subsidy ( 0<= okow ττ ) should be set to achieve the Pareto optimal levels of labor employed and 
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investment by removing the monopoly inefficiency.  One point that should be noted is that these 
socially-optimal subsidies in relation to labor income owτ  and capital income okτ  only aim at 
removing production inefficiency caused by market imperfections, and they are not able to serve as 
instruments in remedying the environmental externality (either in regard to the households’ utility or 
the firms’ production).   
2. There are two kinds of distortions in the economy: (i) production inefficiency caused by the 
market imperfections ( 10 <<η ); and (ii) the negative pollution externality in regard to the 
households’ utility ( 0>ξ ) and the firms’ production ( 0>β ).  The first-best emission tax, i.e. 
0>oeτ , will be used to remedy these distortions.6  When the market imperfections and pollution 
externality in relation to production are ignored ( 0== βη ), (22) reduces to the common condition 
for a Pigouvian tax, i.e. MRSoe =τ , which means that the socially-optimal emission tax should be 
equal to the marginal damage under perfect competition in order to eliminate the pollution 
externality on the households’ utility.  However, if the pollution externality in regard to the 
households’ utility is absent ( 0=ξ ), the socially-optimal emission tax becomes nil even though the 
economy is characterized by market imperfections ( 10 <<η ) and a pollution externality on 
production ( 0>β ).   
However, if we ignore β  only (i.e. 0=β ), (22) will atrophy to MRSoe )1( ητ −= , indicating 
that the Pigouvian tax for an imperfectly competitive market should be lower than that under perfect 
competition.  The intuition behind this result is straightforward.  In the monopolistic market, firms 
will restrict their output below socially-optimal levels, and a tax on waste emissions will lead to a 
further contraction in output.  To alleviate the production inefficiency, the Pigouvian tax should 
thus be lower.  This result is basically consistent with Buchanan’s (1969) argument and Cropper 
and Oates’ (1992) conclusion, which is that imposing a Pigouvian tax on a monopolist will 
conceivably reduce social welfare, since the welfare gains from reduced pollution must be offset 
                                                 
6 As mentioned previously, the condition βα >  should be satisfied in the centralized economy.   
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against the losses from the reduced output of the monopolist.  Therefore, the regulatory authorities 
should introduce two policy measures: a Pigouvian tax on waste emissions plus a unit subsidy to 
output equal to the difference between marginal cost and marginal revenue at the socially-optimal 
level of output.   
3. To sum up, unlike the labor income and capital income taxes, the first-best environmental tax 
will fully internalize the adverse external effects of pollution on the households’ utility and the 
intermediate firms’ production as well as production inefficiency caused by imperfect competition.  
To remedy these distortions, the socially-optimal pollution tax increases with the extent of the 
pollution externality on utility ξ  and on production β , but decreases with the degree of monopoly 
η .   
In an optimizing macro model with intertemporal consideration, it is also important to further 
explore whether the first-best tax policy should mitigate business cycle fluctuations.  Based on 
Proposition 3, we establish Proposition 4 as follows: 
 
Proposition 4.  In the presence of environmental externalities and market imperfections:  
(i) The first-best tax on labor and capital incomes are independent of the productivity shock 
tA .  
(ii) The Pigouvian tax, however, should be lower in a recession caused by an adverse 
productivity shock.  That is, to mitigate business cycle fluctuations, the socially-optimal 
rate of emission tax will serve as an automatic stabilizer that will move positively with the 
macroeconomic conditions.    
Proof:  See Appendix H.   
Proposition 4(ii) points out that, to achieve a social optimum, the social planner needs to address the 
interrelationships between the macroeconomic aggregates of different time periods.  The first-best 
environmental policy may be designed to affect the economy procyclically, for example by 
stimulating the economy with a lower emission tax in recessions caused by adverse productivity 
disturbances.  In other words, the environmental policy may be characterized by a Keynesian-like 
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stabilizer that is designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations.   
 The result in Proposition 4(i) is somewhat different from that of Guo and Lansing (1999).  By 
taking the tax allowance of capital depreciation into account, Guo and Lansing (1999) show that the 
first-best tax rate on capital income may be positive, negative, or zero, and that it is related to the 
productivity shocks.  However, given the assumption of zero capital depreciation in this model, we 
find that the first-best capital income tax rate must be negative and independent of the economic 
fluctuations.7  
 
5. The Relationship between Output and Pollution   
The purpose of this section is to examine the relationship between income ty  and pollution 
tS , which is the so-called environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) in both decentralized and centralized 
economies.   
In the market equilibrium with the symmetric condition tt eS = , (7c) refers to the relationship 
between output and pollution as follows: 
tte yS )1( ηατ −= .               (23) 
Since eτ , α  and η  are constant over time, (23) indicates that the relationship between ty  and 
tS  appears to be positively monotonic and, as a result, the EKC does not exist in the decentralized 
economy.   
 Let us now turn to the centralized economy where the first-best policy is realized.  Let “~” 
over the relevant variables denote their stationary values.  From (15) and (20a)-(20d) with 0=tk&  
and 0=tv& , the steady state relationships can be expressed by: 
 tvc ~~ =−σ ,                 (24a) 
 
t
t
tt h
yvh ~
~~)1(~ θαε −−=Λ ,              (24b) 
                                                 
7 When we substitute the condition of zero capital depreciation into Guo and Lansing’s (1999) result (equation (30) in 
their paper), their result is the same as ours. 
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These relationships allow us to establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5. In the presence of environmental externalities and market imperfections, output 
and pollution exhibit a positive (negative) relationship if σ>1  ( σ<1 ) in the centralized 
economy where the first-best tax policy is realized.  
Proof:  See Appendix I.   
Proposition 5 points out that the Environmental Kuznets Curve may exist in the centralized economy 
where the first-best policy is realized.  As depicted by Figure 4, the relationship between output and 
pollution crucially depends upon whether the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption 
is smaller or greater than unity. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
In this paper we have developed a dynamic optimizing macro model that is characterized by 
market imperfections and environmental externalities on welfare and production.  These two 
distortions provide a government with an incentive to intervene in the markets by setting the 
first-best tax policy.  It has been shown that the first-best labor income and capital income taxes 
will focus on remedying production inefficiencies caused by market imperfections. However, to fully 
internalize the environmental externality and production inefficiency, the socially-optimal pollution 
tax will increase with the extent of the pollution externality in relation to the households’ welfare and 
the firms’ production and will decrease with the firms’ monopoly power.   
This paper has also found that, in the market equilibrium in response to an 
anticipated increase in the emission tax, whether or not consumption and capital 
accumulation will increase or decrease will crucially depend on the extent to which the 
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return in terms of the productivity from utilizing emissions offsets the negative 
production externality caused by that.  If the environmental externality is relatively 
large, the consumption and capital effects of environmental taxation will be reinforced 
by the degree of monopoly.  In addition, in a way that differs from the common 
double-dividend hypothesis, we have shown that the employment (or output) double 
dividend can be realized by an ambitious environmental policy even if the revenue from 
the environmental tax is recycled by means of a non-distortionary lump-sum transfer, 
when the effect of the environmental externality is taken into account.   
With regard to the transitional dynamics, it is found that, following an announced increase in 
the emission tax, during the period between the policy’s announcement and its implementation, the 
private capital stock may “mis-adjust” from its long-term steady state.   
Finally, by investigating the relationship between output and pollution, this study has pointed 
out that there exists a positive relationship between output and pollution in a decentralized economy.  
However, when focusing on the centralized economy where the first-best tax policy is realized, 
output and pollution may exhibit either a positive or a negative relationship, depending on whether 
the rate of the households’ time preference is smaller or greater than unity.  
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Totally differentiating (4a), (7a)-(7c), and (13) in the text, we have: 
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Based on (A1), we can easily derive the following comparative statics: 
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where 0)1()1( >++−−=Γ εβθαε  and 0)1( >+++−=Ω θββαε .                   □ 
 
Appendix B   
Let superscript ‘*’ denote the stationary values of relevant variables.  Linearizing (17) and (18) 
 around the steady-state equilibrium, we have:   
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Appendix C   
According to (B1), we easily obtain:   
0)/(] )1[( 2*2*2112221121 <ΩΨ−−=∆≡−=⋅ ttk kyaaaa σθτµµ ,      (C1) 
where 0)1()]1([ *** >ΩΓ−+++Γ=Ψ ttt chw ηεθσ .  Equation (C1) indicates that the two 
characteristic roots of the dynamic system have opposite signs, implying that the system displays 
saddle-point stability.     
 Define the 0=k&  and 0=c&  loci as the pairs of tc  and tk  that satisfy (17) and (18), 
respectively.  From (B1) the slopes of 0=k&  and 0=c&  are given by 12110 /)/( aakc tktt −=∂∂ =&  
and 22210 /)/( aakc tctt −=∂∂ =& , respectively.  By substituting the initial equilibrium conditions 
**
tt yc =  and ρτ =− *)1( tk r  as well as the wage and interest rate function reported in (7a) and (7b) 
into the above resulting relationships, the slopes of 0=k&  and 0=c&  can be further expressed as:  
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Equations (C2) and (C3) clearly show that the 0=tk&  locus is linear and monotonically increasing 
in the ( ,tc tk ) space and the 0=tc&  locus is linear and monotonically decreasing in the ( ,tc tk ) 
space.   
In addition, given that the production function 0lim
0
=
→ tk
y
t
, from (18) with 0=tk& , we have 
0lim
0
=
→ tk
c
t
.  Moreover, according to the Inada condition, the limit of the marginal productivity of 
capital tends to ∞  as capital approaches zero.  To ensure that the interest rate is bounded and 
equal to )1/( kτρ −  (i.e. the equilibrium condition ρτ =− tk r)1(  reported in (17) with 0=tc&  is 
satisfied), there must exist a positive and substantially large consumption in order to fulfill (16a) due 
to 0/ <∂∂ tt cr .  This implies that 0lim0 >→ tk ct  provided that there exists, say cˆ , so that 
),,,,ˆ(lim
0 tewttk
Akcr
t
ττ
→  is bounded.  With these conditions above, as depicted in Figure 1, the 
dynamic system has a unique perfect-foresight equilibrium.                               □ 
 
Appendix D 
Equation (B1) immediately yields the following comparative statics:   
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Appendix E 
It follows from (13) that ** tt cy =  in equilibrium.  Based on Proposition 1, this resulting 
relationship yields:  
0))(1(
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In addition, substituting the steady-state consumption ∗tc  and physical capital 
∗
tk , yielded by 
(19), into (16c) and (16d), we further obtain: 
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Appendix F 
Differentiating (D1) and (D2) with respect to η , we have:   
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Appendix G  
By comparing (11a) with (20a), we learn that tt v=λ  for all t.  Substituting this condition 
into (11b) and (20b), together with the expression for the equilibrium wage rate (7b), thus yields:  
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1
o
w . 
Analogously, using tt v=λ  in (11c) and (20c), together with the expression for the equilibrium 
interest rate (7a), we can also obtain: 
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Finally, from (4a), (7c), (20a) and (20d), we derive: 
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Appendix H  
To prove Proposition 4, (22) tells us that we should derive MRS in terms of tS  and tc  in the 
centralized economy.  Combining (20a), (20b), and (20d) and replacing tv , we then have the 
following instantaneous relationships of hours worked and the pollution damage: 
),,( tttt Akchh = ,               (H1) 
),,( tttt AkcSS = ,               (H2) 
Letting 0)()1()1( >+++−+++≡ εθαψαεεβθD , the exact expressions of comparative statics 
are:  
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Substituting (H1), (H2), (4a), and (20a) into (20c) and (15), the dynamic system is given by:  
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Let superscript ‘~’ denote the stationary values of relevant variables.  Linearizing (H3) and (H4) 
around the steady state equilibrium, we further have: 
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By letting 1ς  and 2ς  be the two characteristic roots of the dynamic system, from (H5) we can 
obtain: 
,0~/~ 222112221121 <−=−= tt kDybbbb σθφςς           (H6) 
where ))(1)(1()]1()1()[1( βαεσθασθεαψφ −+−−−−+−++= .  Following Burmeister 
(1980), Buiter (1984), and Turnovsky (1995), the dynamic system has a unique perfect-foresight 
equilibrium if the number of unstable roots equals the number of jump variables.  Given that the 
dynamic system reported in (H6) has one jump variable, tc , the restriction 0>φ  should be 
imposed to ensure 021 <ςς .  Therefore, the dynamic system is assured to display a unique 
perfect-foresight equilibrium.   
 With the steady-state equilibrium feature, from (H5) we can easily obtain: 
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Substituting these resulting equations into (H1) and (H2) further yields:  
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By substituting (H7) and (H9) into (22), we show that the first-best emission tax rate is positively 
related to the productivity shock tA , i.e. 
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Appendix I  
From (24a) and (24e), we have ttt vyc ~~~ == −− σσ .  Substituting this relationship into (24c) 
yields: 
 σψ βαξ −+ −= 11 ~)(~ tt yS ,               
Based on this equation, the relationship between output and pollution can be derived as: 
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These derivations confirm the relationship between ty  and tS  as depicted in Figure 4.   
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